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Summary 
 
Common forests in developing countries are valuable sources of raw 
material supplies, employment and income generation, particularly for low 
income households. This paper looks at the effect on income and 
employment when common forest resources have external policies that 
constrain their use. Using a mixed-integer linear programming model, this 
study examines the impacts of conservation-oriented community forest 
policies in Nepal on three household income groups. The results show that 
current community forest policies, which focus on environmental outcomes 
through forest use restriction for environment conservation and timber 
production, result in a large reduction in employment and income of the 
poorest households and largely explain the recent increase in poverty of 
rural areas. 
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Introduction 
 
The economic, social and environmental values of common property resources are 
widely recognized in many countries. Globally, common pool resources in 
mountainous areas have higher values because they have special importance for 
biodiversity conservation, global warming mitigation, and adventure tourism. These 
resources are also more valuable for people in developing countries like Nepal who 
have little access to private land or other opportunities for employment and income.  
 
In Nepal, institutional and geographical factors have made land a limiting factor of 
production. Forestland including shrub-land and alpine pasture comprises 39 percent 
and arable land 21 percent of total land area. The rest of the land provides little scope 
for economic use. In the 2002 agricultural census, the average land holding was less 
than 0.8 hectares per household and 74.1 percent land owing households have less 
than one hectare of land.  The bottom 47 percent of land-owning households owned 
15 percent of total arable land and had an average land area of 0.5 hectares or less. 
Despite being an agriculture-based economy, 29 percent of households are land-less 
(UNDP, 2004), and more than 60 percent of the landholding households in Nepal 
have a food deficit from their own land (CBS, 2003). The landless people manage 
their household needs by working on others‟ farms, encroaching on public lands, 
renting lands (share cropping) or in other employment. In these conditions, it is 
difficult for poor households to support themselves if they do not have adequate 
resources from community forestlands. Historically, mountain communities have 
managed some common lands and used them for the mutual benefit of all 
households. Households with marginal landholdings had easy access to community 
resources to complement their private resources and to sustain their livelihoods. 
 
 3 
Deforestation increased substantially when the Private Forestry Nationalization Act 
(1957) abolished the traditional regulation systems of  common forestlands. 
Landslides in Nepal, flooding in Bangladesh, internationally realization on 
afforestation need for global climate change mitigation occurred at the same time 
(Hauler 1993; Ives and Messerli, 1989). The government and international agencies 
believed these environmental problems to be associated with deforestation and in the 
mid-1970s embarked on a programme of enriching in open patches of common lands 
and change in forest practices (Hobley, 1996). The initial reforestation and protection 
done by the government and aid agencies had mixed success (Master Plan, 1988). 
With the realisation of the importance of users‟ involvement in making forest 
conservation effective, in the late 1980s a local user group-based community forestry 
policy was introduced. The objectives for the policy were “[T]o meet people‟s 
needs” for forestry products, “[T]o support other sectors… in meeting people‟s basic 
needs.” and “[T]o conserve and maintain safe and wholesome natural environment” 
(Master Plan 1988:Pp 68-69). With the active involvement of international aid 
agencies, the government prepared the Forestry Sector Master Plan (1988) to provide 
guidelines for participatory community forestry policy formulation and 
implementation. 
 
The community forestry policies have been successful in terms of improvement in 
forest cover and institutional expansion (Pokhrel and Niraula, 2004). Over 13,000 
forestry users groups were formed in the first 12 years of the community forestry 
programme (CF database, 2003). Deforestation has been halted and tree stocks are 
being restored (Gautam et al., 2002), in some cases to the extent that forests are over-
stocked (Bhatta and Dhakal, 2004). Wildlife populations have increased to the extent 
that the government is being urged to introduce wildlife control policies (Community 
Forestry Division, 2004). In terms of social outcomes, some communities have also 
been able to generate funds from sales of forest products from community forests, 
and these funds are being used for forest conservation and community development 
(Khadka and Shrestha, 2004; Dongol et al., 2002).  
 
Historically, mountain communities managed pastures and forests together in 
common. However, at the time that community forestry was introduced, the cause of 
deforestation, landslides and downstream (Bangladesh) flooding were attributed to 
livestock farming and firewood use by hill farmers (Hausler, 1993; Ives and 
Messerli, 1989). As a result, the focus of reforestation activities, laws and 
institutional changes were on increasing forest cover and limiting access for livestock 
or firewood. For example, one of the policy strategies for reducing forest products 
demand, is “reducing and controlling livestock numbers” (Main Report p. 148) and 
making households fodder supply „fully self sufficient‟ from private lands (Master 
Plan, 1988). Similarly, for reducing demand for firewood from community forests, 
the plan aimed to introduce improved stoves, alternative energy sources (biogas and 
electricity) and increase the area of private plantations.  
 
In addition, the government introduced other policies for biodiversity conservation 
and global warming mitigation to fulfil commitments from the 1992 Earth Summit. 
The government introduced compliance of forest inventory and sustainable 
harvesting of forest resources. Those policies further restricted forest harvesting to 
not greater than 30 percent of mean annual increment (MAI) for slow growing 
species and 60 percent of MAI for fast growing species (Guidelines for Inventory of 
Community Forests, 2000). The government has insufficient trained staff to provide 
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the inventory work. As a result forest inventory compliance has limited harvest of 
timber in many user groups. In addition to the backlog of forest inventory high rates 
of VAT and royalties for timber products from community forests have sharply 
reduced the sale of timber in areas with accessible markets (Community Forestry 
Division, 2004; Kunwar and Kharel 2004).  
 
The net effect of these policies is to restrict the income that communities can receive 
from managing timber crops, and the ability of households to meet other needs from 
community forests. Not surprisingly, a number of studies have shown negative 
distributional outcomes from community forestry. This includes declining and 
irregular access to daily fodder and firewood (Bhatta and Dhakal, 2004), falling 
livestock numbers (Dhakal et al., 2005), and falling employment and income 
opportunities (Bhatta, 2002). The impacts have been greatest on women and poor 
households (Timsina, 2003; Agrawal, 2001). In addition, poor households have been 
shown to have received less benefit from community forests than wealthier 
households (Adhikari et al., 2004).  
 
In these studies, resource scarcity and distributional issues are largely attributed to 
problems in decision-making at the community level. The implication is that if 
community decision-making processes can be improved, this will be sufficient for 
the poor to become better off under current community forestry programmes.  
 
This study starts from the premise that communities can increase income and 
employment if given the chance, and looks at the effect of community forestry 
policies on the ability of communities to generate income and employment. The key 
question is whether current policy allows communities to meet basic needs from their 
resources, and if it does not, whether there are alternative policies that will do this. 
Studies in other countries also have shown that government forest policies affect 
income and employment of rural households (Berck et al., 2003; Kumar, 2002). 
However, the effects of policy constraints on the ability of communities in Nepal to 
use their community forest resources have not been examined in depth.  
 
Modeling Community Forest Based Households 
 
The welfare of a community forestry-based household depends on various sources of 
production and income.  For this model it is assumed that household (j) of income 
group (z) gets outputs (i) from both private land (apjz) and community forestland 
(acjz). The level of community forestry income depends on type of government policy 
(G). In addition the household‟s total family labour endowment (Ljz) is available for 
rest or leisure (ljz), community forestry work (Lcjz), market wage work (Lmjz) and 
farm work (Lfjz). The household‟s total (qijz) supply of products from all sources 
should be greater than or equal to minimum amounts needed (dijz) to meet basic 
needs for food, heating and housing.  
 
The household generates income (yijz) by supplementing household needs for forest 
products, or by selling surplus outputs in markets. In addition to forestry products 
from community and private forest lands, households are able to earn external 
income (ejz) by sacrificing time spent producing forestry based products. However, 
total hours of labour in external employment cannot exceed the employment 
available (E). The households also buy some goods from markets to meet their needs 
at cost piqm. Therefore total income for a household (Yjz) comes from production of i 
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products from private and community lands (yijz), external income (ejz), minus 
expenses on market goods (piqm). The decision problem of the household is to jzpijzjizcijzMaximise Y= f[a, S, a(G)]
……………………….……………….. (1) 
Subject to 
jz cjz pjzjzjzl+ L+ L+tS
 
  
nijzpjzp1aa
 
ncijzccjzi1aa
 
   
nmjz=1z=1Et
 
  

q ijzk
i1
n
  d jzk  
pijzjizcijza, S, a(G)  0
 
 
Many households share the community forest to meet their needs. Households are 
categorised into poor (P), medium (M) and rich (R) households based on sufficiency 
of household income from private landholdings to meet basic needs. The only 
difference between income groups is the initial allocation of private land.  For 
example, poor households have insufficient private land, medium households have 
just sufficient land, and rich households have a surplus of land. Between income 
groups, the initial allocation of private landholdings differ, while within income 
groups the initial allocation of private land is homogeneous. Different income groups 
are able to produce varying amount of output without using community resources. 
The community forest can be managed for joint benefit and treated as another 
household in the community, or it can be treated as private land if rights are allocated 
to individuals to make individual decisions over a particular area.  
 
In this model, we assume that a production system can produce more than one 
product simultaneously and that marginal product is constant. Output of any good i 
under land use u on land type k is then a function of yield per unit area (giuk) and the 
area of land type k allocated to a particular use by a household (auk). Total output of 
any particular good by a household (qi) is then a function of how much land of 
various types the household uses to different uses. Products may be a single output 
from a crop system or byproducts.  
 
  

q i = giuk  a uk 
u =1
m

k1
n
   (2) 
 
In some of the policy issues under study, the output of any particular good may be 
modified by a policy constraint (Cuk) which limits the allocation of land to particular 
uses.  In the unconstrained case Cuk will generally take the value of 1, and when 
constrained a value of 0. 
 
  

q i = giuk  auk Cuk  
u =1
m

k1
n
  (3) 
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In other policy issues under study, the yield per unit area under a particular use will 
be constrained by some percentage (Riu). In the unconstrained case Riu will generally 
take the value of 1.0, and when constrained a value between 0.0 and 1.0. 
 
  

q i = giuk R iu  auk Cuk  
u =1
m

k1
n
  (4) 
 
In some cases, variable costs are labour effort and cash investment on the basis of 
land area used. Market prices are net prices that account for purchased inputs. In 
some cases, the total amount of labour (Lijz) and cash expenses (Iijz) required by a 
household for a particular output is a function of labour inputs per unit area of land 
type k (hik) and cash inputs ($ik) measured as hours per unit area and the area of land 
type k allocated to a particular use by a household (aijzk). Labour cost for a particular 
output of a good for a household is then, ijzikijzkL=ha
…………………………………………..…………….. (3) 
 
Cash expenses for a particular output of a good for a household is then, nijzikijzkk1=$aI
………………………………………………………… (4) 
 
In other cases, the cost is labour effort and cash investment on the basis of harvested 
quantity. The total amount of labour (Lijz) required by a household for a particular 
output is a function of output and harvest productivity for that good (hik) on a 
particular land type, measured as hours and cash amount per unit output. Similarly 
total amount of cash (Iijz) required for a particular output is a function of output and 
harvest productivity for that good ($ik) on a particular land type, measured as cash 
amount per unit output. Labour cost for a particular output of a good for a household 
is then, 
 

L ijz = qijzk  hik 
k1
n
 ………………………………..………………… (5) 
 
Cash expenses for a particular output of a good for a household is then, 
 nijzijzkikk1=qhI
………………………………………………………….. (6) 
 
Some production costs are must be incurred irrespective of the level of production. 
The total fixed cost (FCijzk) for product i on land type k for a household, measured as 
labour hours and cash expenses, is a function of the area allocated to the production 
of a good on a particular land type and the unit area fixed cost (fcik). For private land, 
before-harvest cost is, 
 

FCijzk = fcik  aijzk…………………………………..…………….. (7) 
 
For community forests, all households are required to contribute to the cost of forest 
management equally to retain their property rights irrespective of their level of 
consumption or production. This constitutes what is effectively a labour cost in terms 
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of time for each household. In other cases, the collective cost is simply some amount 
of effort required to maintain the crop. For community forest land, FCik can be 
allocated to households by dividing total fixed cost by the number of households 
(HH). The per household before-harvest cost (FCijzk) for good i on community forest 
land type k is,  
 

FC ijzk =
FC ik
HH
=
fcik  aik
HH
  (8) 
 
In this model, a household is able to generate income by either using labour to 
harvest products from private and community land or earning outside income (ejz).  
The wage rate for a household is assumed to depend on the income group (j) and 
whether the labour is being applied to producing goods (wpj) or earning outside 
income (wej).  Net income from harvesting products is the difference between the 
price of the product (Pi) and the cost of producing the product.   
 
Harvest cost includes both labour input and cash expenses.  The cost of production is 
a function of labour effort by a household and the wage rate for a household group. 
The distribution of output from community forest land types (m through n) is some 
function of C (institutions at policy and community levels). If the value C is equal to 
zero so the household share of community forest output is total output divided by the 
number of households. If M is 
ikjikj(hwpawp)
 then net income from producing 
any good on all land types for a household (yijz) is, 
 njzkijzkimkm ijzkiikj1qP--I-y=qP I- fwp+{;}HHMFCC
… (9) 
 
 
Income from external sources (ejz) is a function of the external wage rate (we) and 
the number of hours spent working outside the farm (tjz).  
 
  

e jz = t jz  we   (10) 
 
Total income for a household (Yjz) comes from production of r products and external 
income, minus expenses on market goods (piqm), 
 rjzijzjzi=1Y=y+empq
………………………………………………… (11) 
 
Community Income Maximisation 
 
The objective in the model is to maximise community income (Y) from its land 
resources.  This can be formulated as a linear programming problem where income is 
maximised across all households in each household group and all products subject to 
constraints. 

Maximise Y = Yjz 
z=1
m

j=1
n
  (12) 
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While allocating common resource the initial income of all households should not be 
reduced.  0jz pjzjzcjzY[a, L, a(G)]  Y
 for all j households in all z groups. ……… (13) 
 
 
For land type k in private ownership, the area of land used by a household to produce 
all products must be less than or equal to the area available.  
 

a ijzk
i1
n
  a jzk …………………………………………………………. (14) 
For land type k in community ownership, the area of land used by all households to 
produce all products must be less than or equal to the area available. 
 
  

a ijzk
i1
r

z1
m

j=1
n
  a k …………………………………………..……… (15) 
 
 
Total hours of labour for a household used to produce goods privately (Ljz), 
contribute in community forestry (
cjzL
) to retain common property rights or work in 
external employment (tjz) must be less than or equal to the hours available for that 
household (Sjz). 
 jzjzjzL++tSc
………………………………………….…… (16) 
 
 
Total hours of labour in external employment must be less than or equal to the 
available employment (E). 
 nmjz=1z=1Et
………………………………………………..… (17) 
 
 
A household needs minimum amounts of particular outputs (dijz) to meet basic needs 
for food, heating and housing. 
  

q ijzk
i1
n
  d jzk ………………………………………………..…… (18) 
 
In this model, community forests are treated as another household trying to maximise 
income.  How the community distributes income from community forests is not the 
issue, only the amount of income that is possible. 
 
Policy Scenarios 
 
The model will show how land and labour resources would be allocated by 
households to maximize income from their land resources if there are no additional 
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constraints (Base Case).  The effects of policy scenarios can be examined by 
applying additional constraints, or by changing the value of parameters or 
constraints, and then comparing the outcome with the Base Case. The scenarios to be 
studied relate to government policies that dictate the use of particular outputs or 
lands, and to forest user group policies about community forest management.  
 
a)  Base Case 
 
The base case is a community forest managed by the community with no 
outside constraints on land use.  This community forest management is 
modelled as a separate household in the community maximising its income 
through sales of outputs. Since this household has no labour supply, it must 
employ others for production. The labour for its management decision comes 
from voluntary contribution of user members. The households buy the products 
from common management to meet their needs and the surpluses of the 
products are sold in the market. As is common practice households can 
purchase community forest output at a lower price than the market price to 
meet its home consumption and employment needs. The model determines the 
distribution of community forest products between the households based on 
profitability of resources uses and community income maximization principles. 
 
b)  Leasing of Community Forest Land 
 
In this case, all constraints on community forest land distribution across 
households and use for firewood, timber and fodder production are relaxed. 
Community forest is allocated (leased) to each household according to their 
ability to use it to maximise community income. In effect, this scenario allows 
households with surplus labour to use community forests as if the land was 
under private management. This policy effectively increases the area available 
to each household depending on labour availability and land productivity. The 
households pays substantial payment to community for leasing land. This 
scenario may not consistent with current leasehold forest practices in Nepal.  
 
c)  Timber Production From Full MAI 
 
In this case, the community forest is modelled as a separate household and can 
only be used for timber production. The community is allowed an annual 
harvest equal to the mean annual increment (MAI). By-products, including 
firewood produced from offcuts or residuals, and fodder harvested from under 
storey species, are also produced for sale. In this scenario, Cu from Equation 
(4) is 1 for timber production and 0 for all other main outputs. By-products 
include firewood produced from offcuts or residuals and fodder harvested from 
under storey species. 
 
d)  Timber Production From Partial MAI 
 
In this case, the community forest is modelled as a separate household and can 
only be used for timber production. However, this case models current 
government policy which is to allow an annual harvest of only 30 percent of 
MAI for hardwoods and mixed deciduous forests, and 50 percent of MAI for 
pine forests. By-products include firewood produced from offcuts or residuals 
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and fodder harvested from under storey species. In this scenario, Riu is 0.3 for 
timber and firewood production in hardwood forests, and 0.5 in pine forests.  
 
e)  Provision of Adequate Firewood 
 
This case is similar to the existing policy in Scenario (d), with the constraint on 
firewood supply relaxed to allow other firewood harvesting to meet household 
requirements. This allows some area to be allocated to firewood production. Riu 
is again 0.3 for timber production in hardwood forests, and 0.5 in pine forests. 
Cu will be 1.0 for both timber and firewood production, with firewood 
production from community forests being contrained to the difference between 
household requirements and private supply. 
 
f)  No Timber Market 
 
This case is similar to the existing policy in Scenario (d), except that the timber 
market is limited to the community. This case prevails in many forest user 
groups in remote districts, where distance from markets and high transport 
costs limit markets for timber output. In this case timber output is constrained 
to the level of household consumption. 
 
g)  Immature Forest or Strict Prohibition on Use 
 
This case demonstrates the outcome for communities when the community 
forest has young age classes and is not producing timber, or is strictly 
prohibited from any kind of use.  In the former case there will still be under-
storey fodder production (Riu = 1.0) but no income from timber (Riu = 0.0), 
while in the latter case there is no income at all (Riu = 0.0 for all community 
forest timber outputs, and Cu will be 0 for all non-timber land uses).  
 
Impact of Policies 
 
This study examines the effect of community forestry policies in three areas, ability 
to meet basic needs, income, and employment. A household needs minimum 
amounts of certain goods (di) for basic survival. The hypothesis is that quantities of 
these goods in the unconstrained case (qiu) will be adequate for each household but 
will be lower and perhaps insufficient in the constrained case (qic). 
 
  

qic  di  qiu    
 
In terms of income, it is believed that the total income of the community with policy 
constraints (Yc) will be lower than in the unconstrained case (Yu). 
 
  

Yc  Yu    
 
In addition, it is believed that the reduction in income will be greater for poor 
households (Y
P
), less for medium income households (Y
M
) and least for rich 
households (Y
R
) and that income disparity will increase.   
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
Yc
R - Yu
R
Yu
R

Yc
M - Yu
M
Yu
M

Yc
P - Yu
P
Yu
P
   
 
  

Yc
R Yc
P  Yu
R Yu
P
   
 
  

Yc
R Yc
M  Yu
R Yu
M
  
 
  

Yc
M Yc
P  Yu
M Yu
P
  
 
In terms of employment, total employment under constraints imposed by government 
policies (Tc) is expected to be lower than an unconstrained situation (Tu).  
  
  

Tc  Tu     
 
In addition, the reduction in employment is expected to be borne more by poor 
households (T
P
) than by medium (T
M
) or rich (T
R
) households. 
 
  

Tc
R - Tu
R
Tu
R

Tc
M - Tu
M
Tu
M

Tc
P - Tu
P
Tu
P
  
 
Data 
 
User groups were selected on the basis of representative forest condition, type of 
forage gathering practices, age of the user group, forest size and level of access to 
district forest office services. The household samples within user groups were 
selected considering geographical location, ethnicity and living conditions. The 
sample population of households were prepared by asking people knowledgeable 
about the general economic condition of households in their communities, which 
households had high, average, and low standards of living in terms of access to 
resources for daily necessities and participation in common social activities. 
However, self sufficiency in food was the main determinant used to group rich, 
medium or poor households.  
 
A semi-structured questionnaire was administered to female heads of 259 farming 
households in six forest user groups in three districts of the mid-hill region of Nepal 
was completed in May-July, 2003. of households. The respondents were asked to 
report their size of land holding of all types of private lands (upland, lowland and 
grassland) including share cropping. They were also asked about their level of food 
sufficiency: deficit for family requirements, just sufficient or surplus available for 
sale. Family size and household labour data were also collected to estimate 
household consumption requirements and available labour force. Information on 
livestock holdings, and firewood and timber collection from community forests were 
also collected.  
 
For the policy modelling a proforma community was derived from an average of the 
six survey groups for private landholding size, consumer units, and labour supply. To 
calculate household calories and livestock feed requirements two young animals 
were considered to have the same feed requirement as one adult. Since the survey 
districts belong to a high population region where the access to community forestry 
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is relatively small (per capita 0.17 ha in survey groups), the national average of 0.2 
ha per capita (FAO, 2000) was used.  
 
The information common to all households were collected from local market surveys 
and key informants. The information includes output and input prices, crop 
production costs, livestock productivity, marketing and livestock labour 
requirements. Input price refers to market prices and product prices refer to farm gate 
prices. The value of firewood and timber used for domestic purposes were mostly 
shadow priced by reference to those prices prevailing in neighbouring communities.  
  
Some data were collected from secondary sources. The data on food productivity and 
nutritional information were collected from FAO (2003) database. Information on 
crop byproduct production was taken from the Forestry Sector Master Plan (1988). 
The labour requirement for timber harvesting and utilization was obtained from the 
Australian Community Forestry Project (2001).  
 
Results 
 
A mixed integer linear programming model based on income maximisation was 
developed to evaluate government forest policies. The model was designed to fit a 
subsistence agriculture economy, particularly in the context of Nepal. In this model, 
resources available in the community, markets and common property were included. 
This has captured the key elements of a multiple-output production system like 
agroforestry. The results are divided into a model validation section which shows 
how well the model represent the communities in the survey, and a policy analysis 
section that evaluates the effect of policies on household incomes, income disparities 
and employment.  
 
Validation 
 
Before using the model for policy analysis, the model was validated by comparing 
the results of a model run that imposed constraints similar to the situation faced by a 
particular user group to information from the survey of households. Table 1 shows 
the difference between predicted and actual results for firewood, timber and livestock 
production.  The difference is expressed as a percentage of the actual production. A 
negative value means the model under-predicted and a positive value means it over-
predicted. The predicted values were reasonably close to survey estimates (within 
20%) for firewood and livestock. Studies shows a big variation on firewood 
consumption survey figures (Garner 1997), and these errors cannot not be avoided 
unless location specific factor based parameters used. Where there are large 
differences, such as in some timber production estimates, this is likely the result of 
incomplete survey data. Actual income data was not collected so cannot be 
compared. 
 
Table 1: Model Validation  
 
Product 
types 
Forest user 
groups 
Household Income Group (% difference) 
Poor Medium Rich All 
 
Firewood 
Kg 
Khorthali -32 15 -255 -35 
Siddeswori 17 27 -7 14 
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Chapanigadi -5 -16 -146 -47 
BanshKharka 28 47 -22 27 
Bidur 50 79 66 69 
Suryamati 23 -222 -196 -54 
Total 9 30 -68 2 
 
Timber 
m
3
 
Khorthali 25 0 100 58 
Siddeswori -5 -12 100 11 
Chapanigadi -1 67 0 39 
BanshKharka -765 -1569 0 -2289 
Bidur -5 0 0 -5 
Suryamati -149 -390 -425 -338 
Total -60 -209 -208 -159 
 
Livestock 
units 
Khorthali 38 43 -191 -5 
Siddeswori 23 6 -38 -5 
Chapanigadi 8 33 -31 -2 
BanshKharka 37 0 -23 2 
Bidur 18 -21 -14 -8 
Suryamati 0 -5 28 9 
Total 17 11 -33 -3 
 
Effect of Policies on Income 
 
In the following discussion, the different policy scenarios will be denoted as follows: 
 
Scenario Short Name 
a) Base Case – Community forest as a household Base Case 
b) Community forest leased to households Leasing 
c) Timber production only from full MAI Full MAI 
d) Timber production only from partial MAI Current Policy 
e) Production of adequate firewood for community Firewood 
f) No local timber market No Log Market 
g) Immature forest Zero Income 
 
Income 
 
The effect of different policy scenarios on community total income are presented in 
Figure 1. Total community income is reduced from the base case with any of the 
restrictive policies. The lowest income is in the zero income forest case.  
 
Figure 1: Total Community Income 
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The results for household incomes in the policy scenarios are presented in Figure 2. 
The incomes of all households decrease as more restrictive forest policies are 
imposed. In the base case scenario, poor and medium income households earn more 
than they do in the zero income community forest scenario (about 124 and 36 percent 
respectively). However, the income difference with the policy change is small (one 
percent) for the rich household. The income of leasehold case was nearly double for 
the poor household in comparison to existing policy scenario. In the No Log Market 
scenario, the community income from the forest is small. The incomes of all 
households and the total community increase to some extent when policy is relaxed 
for need-based firewood production or for harvesting of the full MAI. Income under 
the Lease scenario was greater than in the Base Case for all households.  
 
Figure 2: Comparative Household Incomes And Basic Needs Threshold Level 
 
 
 
 
The horizontal lines in Figure 2 show the minimum income needed for household 
survival. The lower line is the income required to meet essential food (calories), 
firewood and timber requirements as estimated from the model. Without community 
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forest supply, poor households are unable to meet their needs for essential goods. 
The upper line is the income needed for minimum calories and other basic non-food 
items, estimated in 2003 to be Rs 33,626 based on 2001 price inflated at 5 percent 
(NPC 2003). In the No Log Market scenario the income of poor households is below 
this level. However, the other households have a surplus over the income needed for 
survival. The incomes in the Base Case and Lease scenarios are above the survival 
level for all households. 
 
The levels of changes in income across the households under different policy 
scenarios are associated with access to other lands. For example, the rich household 
has a large private landholding. Thus the forest policy affects little to its income. On 
contrast, the poor household has far smaller landholding which is insufficient to 
produce sufficient food and other income. These forest policy constrained 
community land uses and employment opportunities that determined household 
incomes. For all households, the highest income was in forest lease scenario, even 
higher than base case. The lease policy created greater land use flexibilities and also 
saved labour. The resources use efficiencies increased total income.   
 
The resource supply from community forest is essential to sustain the livelihood of 
the poor household. This income effect analysis shows that forest policy constrains 
motivated for environment conservation makes the poor households worse than other 
household groups. This finding is consistent with Gunatilake (1995) study in 
SriLanka, and Kumar (2002) study in India. Fisher (2004) also found a similar result 
that asset poor households benefit more from forest income than others when they 
have access to forest resources.   
 
Income Disparities In Community 
 
Figure 3: Inter Household Income Disparities Across The Forest Policy Scenarios. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the income disparities across the households in the community.  
The income disparities between households varied between forest policy scenarios. 
The shares of the poor, medium and rich households of total community income 
were 24, 34 and 42 percent respectively in the base case scenario. The disparities 
increased as the forest policy constraints are imposed. The shares were 19, 33 and 49 
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percent in the current policy. Income disparities increase in the „no log‟ scenario.  
The leasehold case has 27, 33 and 40 percent shares. Surprisingly, the position of the 
medium income household varies little in the scenarios.  
 
The analysis shows that the community forest policy is a major determinant of 
income disparity in the community. The lowest income disparity among households 
is found in the leasehold forest policy scenario. Forest policies increase income 
disparities and the effect is greatest for poor households. 
 
Effects on Employment 
 
Figure 4 shows comparative results for total unemployment in community under 
different policy scenarios. The employment assessed is based on households direct 
involvement in production and market activities. In the base case, the community 
could employ people from outside the community. In the forest leasehold scenario, 
the demand for labour is notably more than what is available in the community. The 
total community unemployment increases with increases in policy restrictions. 
 
Figure 4: Total Community Unemployment In Different Policy Scenarios 
 
The impacts of these policies on household labour unemployment are presented in 
Figure 5. The graph shows that there is no labour unemployment in the base case. 
Rather the leasehold case has some labour shortage. The policy restriction on forest 
use increase unemployment. The unemployment is more pronounced in the poor 
household than less poor ones. For example, in the current policy scenario, the poor 
and medium households had 400 and 131 unemployment days respectively. On the 
other hand, the rich household hired some labour in most cases.  
 
Figure 5: Household Labour Unemployment  
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Note: Negative signs for hire labourers (need more than household labour supply) 
 
The results show that the policies constraints have a big influence on household 
employment opportunities. The level of employment is directly related to the land 
use type. Some results are unique and need some clarification. For example, in base 
case, the rich household has not hired labour. Firewood collection from community 
forest needs generally more labour than that of private land. In the Base case the rich 
household used its private mostly for firewood production. In existing policy 
scenario the land was distributed almost equally for timber and firewood production. 
The firewood production in private land saved household labour for the rich 
household. Similarly, the number of unemployed people is less in the „no log market‟ 
scenario than for the existing policy. The reason is that many labour days were 
engaged in labour intensive firewood collection. Therefore, the income of poor 
household is greater in the existing policy scenario than the no log market scenario.  
 
Community Forestland Distribution Under Policy Scenarios 
 
Table 2 shows the land uses in different policy scenarios. In the base case and 
leasehold forestry scenarios, the community forestland is used in fodder and timber 
production. In other cases the land is used mostly for timber production. The 
forestland is fully used only in the base case, leasing and full MAI use scenarios. In 
other cases, the community forestland is under used.   
 
 The result shows that the greater the land use for timber products the lesser the 
employment and income for the poor households. The finding that low employment 
in timber based land uses is consistent with Fisher (2001) finding that the land use in 
timber based forestry increased unemployment based poverty in the USA and Japan. 
The timber industry provides few job opportunities for local people when local wood 
industries are not labour intensive (Wunder, 1999). The land use blocks other labour 
intensive activities. This result is consistent with Itodia and Shaha (2002) finding that 
poor household benefits more than less poor households from fodder based 
community forest management. Similarly, the result of the higher employment and 
decreased poverty from livestock based land uses is consistent with the results of 
Anderson et al (2002). Employment opportunity for poor people decreased as the 
timber stocks increase and fodder products decrease in community forests.  
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Table 2: Land Uses In Different Policy Scenarios 
Policy 
Scenario
s 
House 
hold 
types 
Fire 
wood 
Fodder 
buffalo 
Fodder 
goat 
Soft 
wood 
timber 
Hard 
wood 
timbe
r  
Unus
ed 
land Policy 
Scenario
s 
House 
hold 
types 
Fire 
wood 
Fodder 
buffalo 
Fodder 
goat 
Soft 
wood 
timber 
Hard 
wood  
Unuse
d land 
ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha 
Base 
case 
  
Poor  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Need 
based 
firewood 
supply 
Poor  0 0 0 0 0   
Medium  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  Medium  0 0 0 0 0   
Rich  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  Rich  0 0 0 0 0   
Common  0.00 2.26 0.26 0.00 0.47  Common  0.18 0 0 1.25 0.75   
Total 0.00 2.26 0.26 0.00 0.47 0.00 Total 0.18 0 0 1.25 0.75 0.82 
Lease 
  
Poor  0.00 1.11 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Existing 
policy 
Poor  0 0 0 0 0   
Medium  0.00 0.61 0.00 0.02 0.04  Medium  0 0 0 0 0   
Rich  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11  Rich  0 0 0 0 0   
Common  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.08  Common  0 0 0 1.25 0.75   
Total 0.00 1.73 0.00 0.04 1.23 0.00 Total 0 0 0 1.25 0.75 1.00 
Full MAI 
timber 
harvestin
g  
  
Poor  0 0 0 0 0  
No log 
market 
  
Poor  0 0 0 0 0   
Medium  0 0 0 0 0  Medium  0 0 0 0 0   
Rich  0 0 0 0 0  Rich  0 0 0 0 0   
Common  0 0 0 1.5 1.5  Common  0 0 0 0 0.31   
Total 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 0.00 Total 0 0 0 0 0.31 2.69 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The effects of government policies on households‟ income and rural employment are 
analysed in this paper. The findings show that the community forest policies have 
decreased poor household access to land and contributed to rural poverty and 
unemployment. The policies have also increased income disparities between low 
income and high income households. On this basis it is concluded that existing forest 
policies of Nepal are counterproductive and worsen the income distribution.  
 
In Nepal  armed conflicts ocure more frequently in rural areas with low access to 
private land (Murshed and Gates 2005). Social unrest and violence are growing with 
increasing imposition of conservative forest policies. This situation is consistent that 
social unrest and rebellious action increasing with unemployment and poverty (Olzak 
and Shanahan 1996), resource scarcity, social inequality and low access to livelihood 
base-land increases (Murshed and Gates 2005; Homer-Dixon, 1999). It is reasonable 
to conclude that current Nepalese forest policies may have contributed to armed 
conflicts and social unrest in Nepal.  
 
This study has many policy implications. The study showed that the supplies of raw 
materials from common lands are essential to fulfil the basic needs of the poorest 
households. Forests managed for poor households‟ benefit not only fulfils their basic 
needs but also reduce income disparity in the community. Among the policy options, 
leasehold (semi-privatization) approach of forest policy is the most productive and 
helpful in terms of both income and employment generation. If daily need products 
are produced the community management approach is also reasonably good.  If the 
policy objective of the community forests management is employment and income 
generation for socio-political stability, Nepal should change its existing forest 
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management policies towards producing income and employment promoting forest 
products. 
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